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Casenote

The Last Rights: Controversial Ne Exeat
Clause Grants Custodial Power Under
Abbott v. Abbott

I.

INTRODUCTION

The weight to be assigned to the laws and practices of foreign legal
systems in the analysis of international agreements and domestic
statutory disputes has long been a topic of debate in the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of the United States government.' On
1. Compare Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("We must never forget that it
is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. ... [W]here
there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations,
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed
upon Americans through the Constitution."), with Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) ("Of course, we are interpreting our
own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be relevant political and
structural differences between their systems and our own. But their experience may
nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common
legal problem. . . ."). See Donald E. Childress III, Using ComparativeConstitutionalLaw
to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DuKE L.J. 193 (2003) (comparing the alternative

views of utilizing foreign precedence in domestic decisions); Adam Lamparello, A New
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one side of the argument, traditional scholars contend that, as a
sovereign, the United States should make decisions based solely on the
best interests of its citizens, regardless of the detriment imposed on the
international community by such practices.' Conversely, as a modern
approach, the cosmopolitan view of international systems' depicts the
United States as just one member in an international web of judicial,
legislative, and executive decisions, with each country's procedures
affecting the others' laws and lifestyles.'
This debate is becoming increasingly significant as the United States
continues to augment its reliance on foreign products and investments.'
Consequently, the study of international law is becoming less of a legal

Method to Guide ConstitutionalInterpretation:Introducing "NegativeOriginalism,"18 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383 (2007) (discussing the alternative views of Justices of the

Supreme Court of the United States). Interestingly, in Abbott v. Abbott, Justice Scalia sided
with the majority, which utilized international law to determine the definition of a ne exeat
clause as a "right of custody." 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1987-97 (2010). Justice Breyer sided with
the dissent, deciding that the decisions of foreign courts, in this case, were not consistent
with the Hague Convention. Id. at 1997-2010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I fail to see, however, how
the views of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support
for the Court's ultimate determination."); see also id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) ("[Tihe Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus' must go to its appeal . .. to the views of.. . members of the

so-called 'world community'. . . . I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE [Rehnquist], that the
views of professional and religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are
irrelevant. Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of
justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.").
3. See IMMANUEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, in
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 29 (Ted
Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1784).

4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (utilizing foreign precedent to
decide the constitutionality of a state law); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307, 316 n.21 (utilizing
foreign precedent to decide an Eighth Amendment issue); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 13033 (1973) (discussing historical and foreign law in the context of abortion laws); New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 n.4, 583 n.5 (1946) (discussing foreign law in the
context of tax law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) (examining foreign statutes
in the context of setting employment hours); David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in
ConstitutionalLaw, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 544-49 (2001) (describing the history of utilizing
foreign precedence in domestic decisions).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United
States Trade Representative Ron Kirk Signs Agreement on Trade and Economic
Cooperation to Promote American Exports to Brazil (Mar. 19, 2011), available at

http://www.ustr.gov.
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phantom and more a living reality for the United States. As recent
internationally-based cases demonstrate, courts more frequently must
make controversial decisions whether to use the customary legal
practices of foreign nations as informative authority.' In 2010 the
Supreme Court of the United States held in Abbott v. Abbott" that a
parent's ne exeat right granted in a foreign court will be considered by
the United States to constitute a "right of custody," as defined in the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Convention),' rather than a "right of access." 0 In making this
decision about parental child abduction and the contested ne exeat right,
the Supreme Court, through the analysis of foreign custom and legal
precedence, impressed upon domestic courts the importance of foreign
laws when interpreting international treaties.n
The Supreme Court's decision in Abbott should be examined using two
distinct lenses. Viewing this decision domestically, by determining the
United States's stance on international custody rights, the Supreme
Court resolved a federal circuit split and dictated the standard for
domestic courts to follow in cases involving the Hague Convention. 12
More importantly, on an international level, this decision signals to the
international community that the United States judicial system is
willing to utilize foreign laws and policies to interpret treaties to which
the United States is a party.13 This is a lengthy stride in giving the
field of international law more validity in the realm of multi-national
and domestic litigation."

6. See Judge John Kane, InternationalLaw From the Trial Judge's Vantage Point, 35
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 379, 379 (2007) (discussing how international law is rapidly
affecting a court's daily tasks).
7. See, e.g., Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the litigation arising out of the custody dispute for Elian Gonzalez); Kane,
supra note 6, at 380 ("The fact is that international law and foreign law are being raised
in our federal courts more often and in more areas than our courts have the knowledge and
experience to handle.").
8. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
10. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990.
11. See id. at 1993.
12. See id. at 1989.
13. See id. at 1993.
14. See Childress,supra note 1,at 200-01 (discussing the use of foreign law in domestic
cases); Fontana, supra note 4, at 544-49 (describing the history of utilizing foreign
precedence in domestic decisions).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2003 Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, a
United States citizen, separated and relied on the Chilean Family Court
to determine who would retain custody of A.J. Abbott, their young son.
The court awarded Ms. Abbott daily care and control of A.J., and Mr.
Abbott received regular visitation rights. The court additionally granted
a ne exeat order.'s A ne exeat order is a custody device used by
international courts that requires either both parents' consent or
permission from the court before a custodial parent may change a child's
country of residence.1 6
In August 2005 Ms. Abbott removed A.J. from Chile without the
consent of Mr. Abbott or the Chilean court. After a private investigation, Ms. Abbott and A.J. were found living in Texas where Ms. Abbott
had filed for a divorce and a modification of paternal visitation rights in
the State Court of Texas. Mr. Abbott subsequently requested that the
state court grant him visitation rights and order A.J.'s return to Chile.
The state court denied A.J.'s return but granted visitation rights on the
condition that Mr. Abbott remain in Texas. Not satisfied, Mr. Abbott
requested the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas to grant an order, pursuant to the Hague Convention, requiring
A.J.'s return." The district court denied relief and "held that the
father's ne exeat right did not constitute a right of custody under the
[Hague] Convention and, as a result, that the return remedy was not
authorized.""s On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, following the
precedent of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits.19 In contrast to the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit2 0 and the Second Circuit
dissent of former Circuit Court Judge Sotomayor in Croll v. Croll,21 the
Fifth Circuit determined that a parent's ne exeat right is merely a "veto

15. Abbott, 120 S. Ct. at 1988. In Chile, it is customary to grant a ne exeat order to any
parent with visitation rights. Id.
16. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1131 (9th ed. 2009). A ne exeat clause is defined as "[ain
equitable writ restraining a person from leaving, or removing a child or property from, the
jurisdiction." Id.
17. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1988.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1988-89; see Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez
v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
20. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 719-20 (11th Cir. 2004).
21. See 229 F.3d at 144-54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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right" over their child's departure from a country.22 To resolve the
conflict between the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of InternationalChild
Abduction
On October 25, 1980, the Hague Conference on Private International
Law (Hague Conference) 24 formally recognized that there was an
international crisis involving parental abductions of minor children.2 5
The Hague Conference adopted the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction to address this issue.26
Although parental child abduction is not a new issue, the frequency of
abductions has multiplied exponentially resulting from the ease of
international travel, high divorce rates worldwide, and an increase in
intercultural marriages.2 7 Members of broken families are often left
with feelings of "animosity, frustration[,] and bitterness" in response to
parental separation.2 8 In multicultural families, these feelings tend to
be magnified moreso than in monocultural families if there is not an
agreement between the custodial and noncustodial parent as to where,
internationally, and how, culturally, the child will be raised.29 Many
times cultural disagreements involving child-rearing, coupled with the
prospect of receiving more favorable custody adjudications in a home
jurisdiction, are the principle motives behind international parental child

22. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1087 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
23. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1989.
24. Overview, Hague Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net/ind
e&en.php?act=text.display&tid=26 (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Hague
Conference]. The Hague Conference provides the following overview:
[Tihe Hague Conference on Private International Law is a global intergovernmental organi[zlation. A melting pot of different legal traditions, it develops
and services multilateral legal instruments, which respond to global needs.
An increasing number of non-Member States are also becoming Parties to the
Hague Conventions. As a result, the work of the Conference encompasses 130
countries around the world.
Id.
25. Gloria DeHart & William M. Hilton, InternationalEnforcement of Child Custody,
in 5 CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 32.02[1][a]

(Matthew Bender

rev. ed. 2010).
26. Id.
27. Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw (Sept. 2008), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf.

28.
29.

DeHart & Hilton, supra note 25, § 32.01111.
See id.
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abductions among multicultural families?0 Children are often the
victims of this type of separation, frequently losing contact with one of
their parents, leaving their home, and being transplanted into a new
culture."
Currently encompassing eighty-four contracting countries, 32 the
Hague Convention's most notable attribute is the return mechanism,
which prompts contracting countries to return "wrongfully" removed
children to their habitual country of residence." The purpose of the
return mechanism is based on the policy that the best interests of the
child will be met if they are returned to their customary environment
and are allowed the continuity of an ordinary life while disputes are
settled." Moreover, the prompt return of a child to their home country
serves as a deterrent to parents who choose to abduct the child in
violation of court-imposed custody rights as a way of shopping for a more
favorable custody decision from another jurisdiction." The United
States's ratification of the Hague Convention in 19863 and the passage

30. See id. Scholars acknowlege that
[flactors within the family leading to parental child abduction includeDl: (1) an
unworkable relationship between the parents; (2) significant cultural differences
based on the parents' differing nationalities; (3) frustration by lack of access to the
child or fear of loss of the child by prejudiced proceedings, lack of finances or
concealment by the other parent; (4) opportunity; and (5) the prospect of
something to be gained through self-help.
Id.
31. Outline, supra note 27.
32. Status Table-28: Convention of25 October1980 on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, http/www.hcch.

net/indexen.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last updated Feb. 2, 2011).
33. Hague Convention, supranote 9, at 98. The Hague Convention defines "wrongful"
removal as
[tihe removal or the retention of a child .. . wherea) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any
other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either
jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Outline, supra note 27.
36. Id.
37. DeHart & Hilton, supra note 25, § 32.021)(1cilil. The United States signed the
Hague Convention on December 23, 1981. Id. "[Tihe State Department submitted [the
Hague Convention] to the President with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the
Senate for . . . ratification" on October 4, 1985. Id. On October 30, 1985, the Hague
Convention was transmitted. Id. The Senate ratified the Convention on October 9, 1986,
and the Hague Convention became effective July 1, 1988. Id.
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of several domestic child abduction statutes, 3 8 including the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) 9 in 1988, have transformed the United States into an undesirable jurisdiction for abductors
seeking more sympathetic treatment. 40 As an immediate benefit of
implementing the return policy, the United States has witnessed the
return of many children to the United States from other countries so
that custody disputes could be decided in the correct international
forum."
Although a positive step in the direction of limiting parental child
abduction, the Hague Convention has caused conflict in United States
courts with regard to the distinction between a "right of custody" and a
"right of access." 2 A right of custody has been defined by the Hague
Convention as a "right[] relating to the care of the person of the child
and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence.""3 Alternatively, a right of access is described as a visitation
right or "the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place
other than the child's habitual residence."4 Although instances when
the noncustodial parent has been the abductor have been handled
relatively simply by United States courts,45 there has been confusion
when the child has been removed from their habitual residence against
court order by the custodial parent." The Hague Convention provides

38. See, e.g., International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act of 1993 (IPKCA), 18 U.S.C.

§ 1201 (2006); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006); see also
Arpita Gupte, Comment, Rights of Access With Ne Exeat Clause Do Not Create Rights of
Custody Under Hague Convention-Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081 (5th Cir. 2008), 33
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 187 (2010).

39. 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2006). ICARA is the implementing statute for the Hague
Convention. Id.
40. DeHart & Hilton, supra note 25, § 32.02111 [c] [iii].
41.

Id.

42. Compare, e.g., Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 710 (holding that a ne exeat order
is a "right of custody" and thereby splitting the federal circuits), with Croll v. Croll, 229
F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that neither a ne exeat order nor "rights of access"
constitute a "right of custody").
43. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 99.
44.

Id.

45. See, e.g., Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2010); Cuellar v. Joyce, 596
F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Mark Dorosin, You Must Go Home Again: Friedrich v.
Friedrich, The Hague Convention and The InternationalChildAbduction Remedies Act, 18

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 743 (1993) (discussing the Hague Convention and its
implementing statute).
46. Compare,e.g., Furnes, 362 F.3d at 722, 724 (holding that a ne exeat order given to
a noncustodial parent triggers the return mechanism if violated by a custodial parent
under the Hague Convention), with Croll, 229 F.3d at 143-44 (holding that a ne exeat order
given to a noncustodial parent does not trigger the return mechanism if violated by a
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the return mechanism only when a child is abducted from their habitual
residence in opposition to one parent's exercised right of custody;
removal in violation of a limited custody right of access does not trigger
a prompt return. 7 In the United States, the principle issue debated
was the classification of a ne exeat right as either a right of custody or
a right of access" before the Supreme Court made this determination. 9
B.

Early Opinions on Ne Exeat Orders

Up until the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott,o the Second
Circuit's opinion in Croll" and the corresponding dissenting opinion12

custodial parent under the Hague Convention).
47. Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 98-100.
48. Compare, e.g., Furnes, 362 F.3d at 710 (holding that a ne exeat order is a "right of
custody" and thereby splitting the federal circuits), with Croll, 229 F.3d at 135 (holding
that a ne exeat order is not a "right of custody").
49. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1989.
50. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
51. See generally Daniel M. Fraidstern, Note, Croll v. Croll and the Unfortunate Irony
of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Parents
With "Rights of Access" Get No Rights to Access Courts, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 641 (2005)

(discussing implications of the Second Circuit's decision in Croll). The majority opinion in
Croll was written by (former) Judge Jacobs. 229 F.3d at 134. Chief Circuit Judge Dennis
Jacobs
became Chief Judge on October 1, 2006. At the time of his appointment in 1992,
he was a partner in the New York law firm of Simpson[,] Thacher & Bartlett.
Judge Jacobs received his B.A. degree from Queens College of the City
University of New York in 1964; his M.A. degree from New York University in
1965; and his J.D. degree from the New York University School of Law in 1973.
Judge Jacobs was a lecturer in the English Department of Queens College of the
City University of New York from 1967 until 1969. He was in private practice
from 1973 with the new York law firm of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, serving as
a partner there from 1980 until his judicial appointment.
In 1997-2004, Judge Jacobs was a member of the Committee on Judicial
Resources of the Judicial Conference of the United States; starting in 1999 he was
chair of that committee
Judge Jacobs is a native of New York City.
Biographical Information: Dennis Jacobs, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Judgesbio.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
52. Croll, 229 F.3d at 144-154 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion in
Croll was written by former Circuit Court Judge Sotomayor. Id. at 144. Associate
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
was born in Bronx, New York, on June 25, 1954. She earned a B.A. in 1976 from
Princton University, graduating summa cum laude and receiving the university's
highest academic honor. In 1979, she earned a J.D. from Yale Law School where
she served as an editor of the Yale Law Journal. She served as Assistant District
Attorney in the New York County District Attorney's Office from 1979-1984. She
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were the leading-most persuasive-alternative views concerning the issue
of ne exeat rights and the Hague Convention." Similarly to Abbott, in
Croll, Ms. Croll, the custodial parent of minor Christina Croll, removed
Christina from Hong Kong without attaining consent from Mr. Croll in
violation of a Hong Kong court-issued ne exeat order. Mr. Croll's petition
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York was granted by the district court for the return of Christina to
Hong Kong after finding that Ms. Croll wrongfully removed Christina in
violation of the ne exeat order and the Hague Convention.5 ' On appeal,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that,
even when paired with a ne exeat clause, rights of access do not become
rights of custody within the realm of the Hague Convention and thus do
not invoke the return of the child."
The majority opinion in Croll reasoned that the textual and historical
aspects of the Hague Convention, coupled with the lack of conformity in
international case law, did not indicate that ne exeat orders should
convey a right of custody to an otherwise noncustodial parent.56 To do
this, the court utilized the "purpose and design of the [Hague] Convention, its wording, the intent of its drafters, and caselaw in other
signatory states," albeit with significant disparities in the weight
assigned to each." The court explained that courts are not allowed to
"consider the merits of underlying custody disputes.""
Courts may,
however, determine whether there was a "wrongful" removal within the
boundaries of the Hague Convention.o

then litigated international commercial matters in New York City at Pavia &
Harcourt, where she served as an associate and then partner from 1984-1992. In
1991, President George H.W. Bush nominated her to the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of New York, and she served in that role from 1992-1998. She
served as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
from 1998-2009. President Barack Obama nominated her as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court on May 26, 2009, and she assumed this role August 8, 2009.
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2011)
53.

See Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1084-85; Furnes, 362 F.3d at 719; Fawcett, 326 F.3d at 500;

Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 944.
54. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135-36.
55. Id. at 135.
56. Id. at 137-43.
57. Id. at 136 (internal organizational lettering omitted).
58. See id. at 138-43 (placing more weight on the textual aspects of the Hague
Convention rather than on foreign case law).
59. Id. at 138.
60.

Id.
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Utilizing several popular dictionary definitions of "custody," the court
concluded that "custody of a child entails the primary duty and ability
to choose and give sustenance, shelter, clothing, moral and spiritual
guidance, medical attention, education, etc., or the (revocable) selection
The court
of other people or institutions to give these things. "
disregarded Mr. Croll's argument that a ne exeat right gave him "the
right to determine [the] child's place of residence" and should therefore
be considered a right of custody under the Hague Convention. 62 The
court held that the power to determine a child's home country or
territory by vetoing a custodial parent's decision cannot be considered a
right of custody by any set of standards." Moreover, the court determined that the requirement of returning the child to a parent who had
neither the right nor the responsibility of full custody without also
requiring the return to the custodial parent would be counter to the
purpose of the Hague Convention.64 The court explained that the
Hague Convention "does not contemplate return of a child to a parent
whose sole right-to visit or veto [ne exeat]-imposes no duty to give care"
and thus would be a contradiction to the policy of acting in the best
interests of the child."
Although Judge Jacobs described the textual and structural features
of the Hague Convention as sufficient to define a ne exeat right, in
referring to extrinsic sources, the court analyzed the P6rez-Vera
Report" to further realize the intent of the Hague Convention's
drafters." As the official reporter of the Hague Conference, the PdrezVera Report
recount[edl that [allthough the problems which can arise from a breach
of access rights, especially where the child is taken abroad by its
custodian, were raised. . . the majority view was that such situations
could not be put in the same category as the wrongful removals which
[the Convention] is sought to prevent.68

61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140-41.

64. Id. at 140.
65.

Id. at 140.

66. Elisa P6rez-Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague Child Abduction
Convention, in 3 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION 426 (1982), available
779

.
at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2
67. See Croll, 229 F.3d at 142 (analyzing the Perez-Vera Report).
68. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also PerezVera, supra note 66, at 444-45.
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The court thus concluded that the option of applying the return
mechanism to situations in which rights of access were violated was
contemplated and subsequently rejected by the Hague Conference. 9
Furthermore, the court relied on correspondence regarding the Hague
Convention from the Secretary of State, George P. Schultz, to President
Reagan, who wrote that "[tihe remedies for breach of the access rights
of the non-custodial parent do not include the return remedy."70
Secretary Schultz also clarified that "[plersons should not be able to
obtain custody of children by virtue of .

.

. wrongful removal or

retention."n These discussions of extrinsic sources by the court further
compelled the holding that ne exeat rights were not intended as rights
of custody. The court maintained that, in instances when the custodial
parent violates the noncustodial parent's rights, there are other methods
of relief, short of returning the child, to a parent deemed only to have
access rights. 72
As the final analysis, the court put little weight in the opinions issued
by other signatories of the Hague Convention, exemplifying the court's
use of the traditional view of sovereignty as the approach to interpreting
treaties.
The court stated that although "opinions of our sister
signatories [are] entitled to considerable weight,"" there are "no
doctrine[s] requiring our deference to a series of conflicting cases from
foreign signatories."7 The court went so far as to say that the cases
worldwide were "few, scattered, conflicting, and sometimes conclusory
The Second Circuit's practice of skeptically
and unreasoned." 76
utilizing foreign law to solve treaty and convention disputes and giving
more deference to domestic laws and traditions was adopted by the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Croll, 229 F.3d at 141-42.
Id. at 142 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 143.

74.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
75.

Id.

76. Id.
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Ninth Circuit in 2002 in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, and again, in 2003 by
the Fourth Circuit in Fawcett v. McRoberts."
In her dissent, former Circuit Court Judge Sotomayor focused on the
text of the Hague Convention in reference to the Convention's international objective and purpose." Judge Sotomayor argued that although
United States custom is important to treaty interpretation, this subject
requires courts to "look beyond parochial definitions to the broader
meaning of the Convention" as a reason why the court should rule in
favor of viewing ne exeat orders as rights of custody.'
Additionally,
Judge Sotomayor proffered the argument that only one custody right
need be violated to allow for the return mechanism under the Hague
Convention."' Despite Judge Sotomayor's argument, United States
courts seemed unwavering in the consideration of a ne exeat clause as
merely a right of access instead of a right of custody.82 This changed
in 2004 with the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Furnes v. Reeves. 83

77. 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002). In Gonzalez, Ms. Gutierrez, after living in a violent
marital relationship with Mr. Gonzalez, filed for divorce and received custody of her
children in a Mexican court. The order from the court included a ne exeat clause, requiring
consent from both parents before removing the children from Mexico. Ms. Gutierrez, after
suffering several violent attacks from her ex-husband, removed the children without his
consent to California, violating the ne exeat provision. Mr. Gonzalez petitioned for the
return of the children in accordance with the Hague Convention and its implementing
statute. The district court, conducting an analysis of first impression in the Ninth Circuit,
found that the ne exeat provision was violated and that the children would have to be
returned to Mexico. Id. at 946-47. On appeal, however, utilizing the Second Circuit's
opinion in Croll, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, holding that "the
existence of a ne exeat clause in the divorce agreement [did] not transform [Gonzalez's]
visitation rights into custodial rights under the [Hague] Convention." Id. at 948. Much
like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also discounted the use of foreign court opinions
in deciding this issue, stating that foreign opinions give "no clear consensus" and thus
should be weighed lightly. Id. at 952.
78. 326 F.3d 491 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit encountered its first bout with
the ne exeat clause in 2003 with Fawcett v. McRoberts. See 326 F.3d 491. Involving a

similar set of facts as Croll and Gonzalez, the court reversed the district court, holding that
the child was not required to be returned to Scotland from the United States after his
custodial father removed him in violation of a Scottish court order requiring the child to
remain in Scotland. Id. at 499, 501.
79. Croll, 229 F.3d at 144 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 145.
81. Id. at 147.
82. See sources cited supra notes 77-78.
83. 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 2004).
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C. Circuit Split Gives Life to Croll Dissent-The Eleventh Circuit
The dissent of Judge Sotomayor in the Croll opinion remained
dormant until 2004 when the Eleventh Circuit issued its first opinion
regarding ne exeat clauses.' In Furnes Mr. Furnes and Ms. Reeves
agreed on a custody schedule for their daughter in a Norwegian court.
Both parents were to have "joint parental responsibility" with Ms.
Reeves retaining custody." In accordance with Norwegian law, joint
parental responsibility includes a ne exeat clause." Soon after agreeing
on the custodial settlement, Ms. Reeves requested permission to take her
daughter to the United States. Ms. Reeves never intended on returning
to Norway with her daughter, and she remained in the United States
without notifying Mr. Furnes of their whereabouts. Mr. Furnes
subsequently conducted a private international search for his daughter.
After locating his child in Georgia, Mr. Furnes filed a request for the
return of his daughter to Norway pursuant to the Hague Convention and
its implementing statute. The district court denied Mr. Furnes's petition,
holding that he merely maintained rights of access coupled with a ne
exeat order, and therefore, his situation would not trigger the use of the
Hague Convention's return mechanism."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit broke new ground by holding contrary
to the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, creating a split in the federal
courts regarding ne exeat issues. The Eleventh Circuit used many of
the same tools utilized in the previous ne exeat cases, but the court
distributed the weight given to each of these tools differently, similar to
the dissent in Croll.89 The court first established that only one
parental custody right needed to have been violated to prompt the return
of a child under the Hague Convention, varying from other courts that
described rights of custody as bundled rights.o Under the bundled
rights theory, all aspects of custody would have to have been violated to
use the return mechanism." Thus, according to this theory, the return
of a child would only be a remedy in situations when the noncustodial

84. See id.
85. Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 707-08.
87. Id. at 708-09.
88. See id. at 704.
89. Compare id. at 710-14, with Croll, 229 F.3d at 144-54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
90. Compare Furnes, 362 F.3d at 714-15, with Croll, 229 F.3d at 141-43 (determining
that the drafters of the Hague Convention did not intend a violation of a single custodial
right to invoke the return remedy).
91. Croll, 229 F.3d at 139.
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parent has abducted the child in violation of the custodial parent's

rights. 92

Like the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit
began by analyzing the text of the Hague Convention; conversely,
however, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished that "in applying the Hague
Convention, Icourts) must look to the definition of 'rights of custody' set
forth in the Convention and not allow . .. different American concepts
of custody to cloud [the courts'] application of the Convention's terms."93
Rather than utilizing dictionary definitions of key terms, the court
analyzed the Norwegian law on which the custody agreement was
based.9 4 The court held that the decision of where the child would live
was divided into two parts of equal importance in regards to the "place
of residence" language in the Hague Convention definition of right of
custody.95 Part one of the decision was where the child would live
within Norway, the custodial right of Ms. Reeves, and part two was
whether the child could live outside of Norway, the custodial ne exeat
right of Mr. Furnes."
Noting that the Hague Convention does not explicitly include a
definition of the phrase "place of residence," the court maintained that,
as an international treaty, the Hague Convention was signed using a
global vision." The court noted that the purpose of the Hague Convention was to form an alliance of foreign policies on parental child
abduction so that treaty signatories could be certain that custody
disputes and the children central to these disputes would remain within
Realizing the international
the country of original jurisdiction."
purpose and the practicalities of enforcing the Hague Convention, the
court indicated that place of residence was more likely to refer to a
country or region of residence rather than the specific city, street, or
actual home where the child would reside. Furthermore, the court
held that not only would Mr. Furnes be determining the place of
residence for his daughter but, by deciding to enact his ne exeat right, he
would be ensuring that his daughter would "participate in Norwegian
culture."oo Therefore, he additionally would be making decisions
"relating to the care of the person of the child," which is the principle

92.

See id.

93. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 711.
94. Id. at 715.

95. Id.; see also Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 99.
96. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 715.

97. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 710; see also Hague convention, supra note 9, at 98.
99. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 715.
100. Id. at 716.
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portion of the rights of custody definition.' 1 The court also determined that to maintain the status quo of the child's custody, the child
would need to be returned to the country in which her parents had made
the agreement; otherwise, the United States would be determining
custody issues already decided by a foreign court.'02
In moving from the text of the treaty to international custom, the
court cited the adoption of broadly-viewed definitions concerning rights
of custody in courts of the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and
Israel.'o These foreign "courts have stressed the need for enforcement
of custody orders (including ne exeat clauses).""' The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that there are foreign decisions in opposition to the
holding in Furnes'os but noted that these cases are far less cited due
to less persuasive reasoning and dissimilar fact patterns.'
Ultimately the court acknowledged its split from the Second Circuit by joining
Judge Sotomayor's powerful dissent in Croll.1o' This argument would
not make its next appearance until the Supreme Court's decision in
Abbott.
IV.

CouRT's RATIONALE

In 2008 the Fifth Circuit gave its opinion in Abbott v. Abbott,'0
determining which side of the ne exeat conflict the court would
adopt.'
Utilizing the alternate opinions of the federal circuits, the
court found the argument in Croll v. Croll"o more persuasive and held
that ne exeat clauses would not furnish rights of custody to noncustodial
parents."' Determining that a uniform holding was necessary, the

101.
at 99.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hague Convention, supra note 9,

102. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 717.
103. Id. at 717-18. See generally International Child Abduction Database, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.incadat.com (last visited Mar.

23, 2011) [hereinafter INCADAT] (summarizing cases discussed in Furnes).
104. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 717.
105. Id. at 718; see also INCADAT, supra note 103 (summarizing Canadian and French
decisions discussed in Furnes). The court further mentioned that in both Canadian cases
the reference to ne exeat rights as rights of custody were expressed in dicta, and therefore,
were not as persuasive. Furnes, 362 F.3d at 718. Moreover, the court described the
holding of the French court as misguided because the court "focus [ed] on the mother's right
to expatriate rather than the issues of custody set forth in the Hague Convention." Id.
106. Furnes,362 F.3d at 718.
107. Id. at 719.
108. 542 F.3d 1081 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).
109. See id. at 1082.
110. 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
111. Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1087.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari"' to decide the custody status of ne
exeat orders."'
Ten years after the Croll decision, Justice Sotomayor was given a
second chance to weigh in on the issue of international parental child
abduction and ne exeat clauses. This time her dissenting argument in
Croll became the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Abbott (as
written by Justice Kennedy)." 4
The Majority Opinion-A Victory for Justice Sotomayor
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy made several breakthroughs
in ultimately defining a ne exeat right as a right of custody."s The
Court additionally determined that a ne exeat right can be exercised
absent its outright violation." 6 Furthermore, the Court gave significant deference to the opinions of fellow contracting nations to the Hague
Convention regarding ne exeat clauses, evidencing a movement by the
Court toward the cosmopolitan perspective."'
The Court, similarly to the Eleventh Circuit, first consulted the
textual aspects of Mr. Abbott's custody settlement in the context of
Chilean law and the text of the Hague Convention to determine whether
the Chilean version of a ne exeat order should be considered a right of
custody under the Convention."" The Court noted that a Chilean

A.

112. Abbott v. Abbott, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009).
113. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (2010).
114. Compare id. at 1987-97, with Croll, 229 F.3d at 144-54 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
was born in Sacramento, California, July 23, 1936. He married Mary Davis and
has three children. He received his B.A. from Stanford University and the London
School of Economics, and his LL.B. from Harvard Law School. He was in private
practice in San Francisco, California from 1961-1963, as well as in Sacramento,
California from 1963-1975. From 1965 to 1988, he was a Professor of Constitutional Law at the McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. He has served
in numerous positions during his career, including a member of the California
Army National Guard in 1961, the board of the Federal Judicial Center from
1987-1988, and two committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States:
the Advisory Panel on Financial Disclosure Reports and Judicial Activities,
subsequently renamed the Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct, from
1979-1987, and the Committee on Pacific Territories from 1979-1990, which he
chaired from 1982-1990. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in 1975. President Reagan nominated him as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat February 18, 1988.
Biographies of CurrentJustices of the Supreme Court, supra note 52.

115. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990.
116. Id. at 1991-92.
117. See id. at 1993.
118.

Compare id. at 1990, with Furnes, 362 F.3d at 714-15.
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agency explained the ne exeat provision to mean "neither parent can
unilaterally establish the [child's] place of residence.""' The Court
further determined that the Hague Convention defines all custodial
rights "relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular,
the right to determine the child's place of residence" as rights of
custody.1 2 0 The Court conceded that "a ne exeat right does not fit
within traditional notions of physical custody" and that this distinction
was "beside the point." 2' After discussing the definition of "determine," the Court concluded that Mr. Abbott's ne exeat right gave him the
right "[tlo set bounds or limits to" the place of his child's residence and
the care of the child because requiring that the child remain in Chile
instead of the United States would affect the child's cultural upbringing. 122
Disagreeing with Ms. Abbott's argument that ne exeat rights are not
custody rights because they cannot be exercised, the Court held that "a
ne exeat right is by its nature inchoate and so has no operative force
except when the other parent seeks to remove the child from the
country. 123 Therefore, "[wihen one parent removes the child without
seeking the ne exeat holder's consent, it is an instance where the right
12 4
would have been 'exercised but for the removal or retention.'"
Further, the Court maintained that in contrast to access rights, ne exeat
right violations may only be remedied with the return of the child. 121
When considering extrinsic sources, the Court first gave light to the
views of the United States Department of State."' These views
endorse the opinion that ne exeat clauses are rights of custody: "The
Executive is well informed concerning the diplomatic consequences
resulting from this Court's interpretation of 'rights of custody,' including
the likely reaction of other contracting states and the impact on the
State Department's ability to reclaim children abducted from this country."127 In accord with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis, the Court
described the international opinion of ne exeat as a custody right to be

119. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hague Convention, supra note 9,
at 99.
121. Id. at 1991.
122. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1991-92.
124. Id. at 1992; see also Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 99.
125. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1992.
126. Id. at 1993.
127. Id.
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one of "broad acceptance." 128 The Court recognized that the Canadian
Supreme Court has adopted a contrary view, and that French courts are
Nevertheless, the harmony of the court
divided on the subject.'
systems in contracting nations such as England, Israel, Austria, South
Africa, Germany, Australia, and Scotland persuaded the Court to rule
that ne exeat orders convey custody rights."o Additionally, the Court
referenced a consensus among scholars regarding the violation of ne
exeat orders as a trigger to the return remedy of the Hague Convention."' Thus, the Court determined that the United States should be
compelled to follow international custom and legal precedence in this

treaty's interpretation.132

Returning to Justice Sotomayor's earlier dissent in Croll, the Court
maintained that "[d]enying a return remedy for the violation of such
rights would 'legitimize the very action-removal of the child-that the
home country, through its custody order [or other provision of law],
sought to prevent.',as3 In conclusion, the Court explained that allowing a custodial parent to remove a child in violation of a ne exeat clause
would undermine the Hague Convention's purpose of preventing forum
shopping.xa3
B.

Justice Stevens's Dissent
Joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer, Justice Stevens'13 dissented

128. Id.
129. Id. at 1994.
130. Id. at 1993-94.
131. Id. at 1994.
132. See id. at 1993.
133. Id. at 1996 (second alteration in original) (quoting Croll, 229 F.3d at 147
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
134. Id.
135. Now retired, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens
was born in Chicago, Illinois, April 20, 1920. He married Maryan Mulholland, and
has four children - John Joseph (deceased), Kathryn, Elizabeth Jane, and Susan
Roberta. He received an A.B. from the University of Chicago, and a J.D. from
Northwestern University School of Law. He served in the United States Navy
from 1942-1945, and was a law clerk to Justice Wiley Rutledge of the Supreme
Court of the United States during the 1947 Term. He was admitted to law
practice in Illinois in 1949. He was Associate Counsel to the Subcommittee on the
Study of Monopoly Power of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1951-1952, and a member of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study Antitrust Law, 1953-1955. He was Second Vice President of
the Chicago Bar Association in 1970. From 1970-1975, he served as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. President Ford
nominated him as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and he took his seat
December 19, 1975. Justice Stevens retired from the Supreme Court on June 29,
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from the majority opinion and agreed with the argument proposed by the
Second Circuit in Croll.as The dissent focused on the traditional
concept of custody rather than an international one."' The dissent
referred to the ne exeat clause not as a right but rather an "opportunity
In accord with the opinion in Croll, the
to veto" or restrict travel.'
dissent argued that it would be contrary to the purpose of the Hague
Convention to return a child to a noncustodial parent.'a Moreover,
the dissent emphasized that although "[tihe fact that a removal may be
'wrongful' in the sense that it . .. violates only 'rights of access' does not
make it 'wrongful' within the meaning of the [Hague] Convention."14 0
The dissent also criticized the weight afforded to the contrary opinions
of international courts and noted that the Department of State's opinion
on the issue has changed throughout the years since the implementation
and ratification of the Hague Convention.14 1 Ultimately, the dissent
disapproved of using the return remedy to protect noncustodial parents'
rights. 142
V. IMPLICATIONS
Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Mr. Abbott by allowing
a ne exeat order to constitute a right of custody,"" the real-life consequences for the Abbotts are minimal. There are exceptions to the Hague
Convention's return mechanism,'" and since the provisions of the
2010.
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 52.
136. Compare Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1997-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting), with Croll, 229
F.3d at 135.
137. See Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1997 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing activities that

would traditionally suggest custody).
138. Id.
139. Compare id. at 1997-98, with Croll, 229 F.3d at 139.
140. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1998 (Stevens, J., disenting).
141. Id. at 2007-09.
142. Id. at 2010.
143. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010).
144. See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 9, at 100-01. If "it is demonstrated that
the child is now settled in its new environment," the Hague Convention does not require
the child's return. Id. at 100. Moreover, the Hague Convention provides that a state is not
required to return a child if:
the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or
had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or . . .
there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
Id. at 101. Additionally, the Hague Convention allows the administrative authority to
"refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned
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Hague Convention only apply to children under the age of sixteen, ' 5
A.J., now fifteen, will soon be allowed to personally choose his home.
While this opinion is of little consequence to the specific actors in this
case, in making this monumental decision, the Court has made
significant contributions to international family law disputes litigated in
the United States and to the United States' view on treaty interpretation. These contributions should be bilaterally examined.
Domestically, the Court's opinion in Abbott has determined the
definitive holding for the United States judicial system regarding ne
By resolving the federal circuit
exeat clauses as rights of custody.'
split of opinion, the Supreme Court has decided a uniform position for
all domestic courts to follow and gives guidance in the area of international family disputes-an area that was lacking in domestic consensus
before the decision in Abbott.147 Now, the Hague Convention's purpose
to prevent forum shopping can be uniformly applied throughout the
United States federal court system. Parental child abductors, in
deciding their forum of choice, will no longer have the additional option
of choosing the most favorable federal circuit. Moreover, with the
decision in Abbott, United States courts can be certain that custody
decisions are made in accord with the foreign policies of the United
States government. Thus, in determining foreign family law issues
United States courts are now less likely to unintentionally determine
international policy, a task assigned to the executive branch.
Most noteworthy, on an international level, is the Court's determination of the United States's stance on treaty interpretation. The Court's
analysis and decision in Abbott exhibits that the United States regards
the Hague Convention-and other international treaties-as significant
enough to require the substantial expenditure of time and resources to
solve treaty disputes. Interestingly, both the majority and the dissent
claimed to apply similar approaches to their analyses but came to very
different conclusions. 4 8 The majority concluded that the foreign
country's law and the international nature of the Hague Convention
need to be analyzed to define ambiguous terms within the Hague
Convention and determine the actual custodial meaning of a ne exeat

and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account
of its views." Id.
145. Id. at 99.
146. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990.
147. See id. at 1988-89.
148. See id. at 1983-2010 (beginning with a textual analysis and then moving to an
analysis of extrinsic sources in both the majority and dissenting opinions).
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order.149 Conversely, the dissent determined that the interpretation
should be made based on United States custom, and ambiguous terms
should follow common United States word usage and meaning."so
Regardless of how the Supreme Court Justices examined the issue, the
majority and the dissent utilized international precedent whether it was
to support or oppose the acceptance of a ne exeat clause as a custody
right. The use of foreign law in a time when controversy abounds
around using foreign precedence in United States courts 5'1 suggests
that the Court has only limited its use of foreign policy to questions
requiring judicial interpretation of the United States Constitution and
domestic statutes.15 2 The Abbott opinion ultimately sends a message
to the world that the United States is willing to accept the laws of
international courts in its opinions to further become an effective
international partner in worldwide justice.
DANIELLE

L. BREWER

149. See id. at 1990-97.
150. See id. at 2008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that the Court "should not
substitute the judgment of other courts for [its] own").
151. See Childress,supra note 1, at 193-97 (comparing the alternative views of utilizing
foreign precedence in domestic decisions).
152. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.

